The Court of Appeals determines that a standard interspousal transfer grant deed (ITGD) meets the requirements for a transmutation of the character of marital property under Family Code section 852.
Section 852 provides in pertinent part: “(a) A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected.” Continue reading →
In Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corpthe California Supreme Court held that in a case where a homeowner alleges a nonjudicial foreclosure sale was wrongful because of a void assignment, the homeowner has standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure.
In Sciarratta v. U.S. Bank National Association the question of “prejudice” left open in Yvanova was decided. Where a homeowner alleges foreclosure by one with no right to do so, do such allegations alone establish the requisite prejudice or harm necessary to state a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure? Or instead, to adequately plead prejudice, does the plaintiff-homeowner have to allege the wrongful foreclosure interfered with his or her ability to pay on the debt, or lead to a foreclosure that would not have otherwise occurred? Continue reading →
In Glaski v. Bank of America, the appellate court held a borrower may base a wrongful foreclosure claim on allegations that the foreclosing party acted without authority because the assignment by which it purportedly became beneficiary under the deed of trust was not merely voidable but void. Subsequent appellate court opinions, for a variety of reasons, refused to follow Glaski.
In Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage the California Supreme Court considered the narrow question, considered in Glaski, of whether the borrower on a home loan secured by a deed of trust may base an action for wrongful foreclosure on allegations a purported assignment of the note and deed of trust to the foreclosing party bore defects rendering the assignment void. Continue reading →
The courthouse doors are now routinely slammed shut against homeowners who allege wrongful foreclosure based upon alleged defects in securitization trusts, despite the holding in Glaski v. Bank of America. Continue reading →
In an unusual move, the California Supreme Court ordered publication of an opinion issued by the Santa Clara County Superior Court, Appellate Division, in an limited jurisdiction unlawful detainer case: Bank of New York Mellon v. Preciado. The decision specified two errors in the unlawful detainer proceedings: 1) the proofs of service of the 3-day notice failed to show that personal service was attempted; 2) the post foreclosure plaintiff failed to prove its title was duly perfected. Each defect required reversal of the judgment and a new and different judgment in favor of defendants. Continue reading →
The Appellate Division, County of Los Angeles, holds that the trial court must exercise its discretion and consider the merits of a motion for relief from forfeiture made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1179, where plaintiff has obtained a default judgment in an unlawful detainer action. Continue reading →
The Sixth Appellate District concludes, in Nativi v. Deutche Bank, that the Protecting Tenants Against Foreclosure Act of 2009 (scheduled to sunset the end of 2014) causes a bona fide lease for a term to survive foreclosure through the end of the lease term — subject to the limited authority of the immediate successor in interest to terminate the lease, with proper notice, upon sale to a purchaser who intends to occupy the unit as a primary residence. The Act impliedly overrides state laws that provide less protection but expressly allows states to retain the authority to enact greater protections. Bona fide tenancies for a term that continue by operation of the PTFA remain protected by California law.
The Orange County Appellate Division concludes in Huntington Continental v. JM Trust that the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act compels a homeowner’s association to accept and apply partial payments that reduce delinquent assessments owed, but not any other amounts due such as late fees, interest, attorney fees, and costs. This is true even if an action has been commenced to foreclose the lien since there is nothing in the Act precluding the acceptance of partial payments of delinquent assessments once litigation has commenced. Continue reading →
1) Failure to timely demand a jury trial;
2) Failure to appear at trial;
3) By written consent;
4) By oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes;
5) By failing to announce that a jury is required, at the time the cause is first set for trial, if it is set upon notice or stipulation, or within five days after notice of setting if it is set without notice or stipulation;
6) By failing to pay jury fees as required by statute. Continue reading →